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I. INTRODUCTION
A 35-year old woman, mother of three children, suffers from Stage IV metastatic
breast cancer.1 After finding a suspicious mass in her right breast, she underwent a
mastectomy.2 Nine months of chemotherapy and radiation followed, making the
woman extremely ill.3 Despite efforts to battle the disease, the cancer was found to
have progressed.4 The woman’s doctor told her that with conventional treatment the
“disease will continue to progress and she will die.”5 Given her situation, the
woman’s doctor suggested a relatively new approach to standard chemotherapy
called High Dose Chemotherapy with Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation

1
Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586, 587 (E.D. Va., 1990).
“Cancer is typically classified in terms of five stages of increasing severity from Stage I to
Stage V. “Stage IV,” in connection with breast cancer, signifies that the cancer cells have
metastasized, i.e. spread, to areas outside of the breast, the original site of the disease.” Id.
2

Id. at 588.

3

Kulakowski v. Rochester Hosp. Serv. Corp., 779 F. Supp. 710, 712 (W.D.NY. 1991).

4

Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Conn., Inc., 764 F. Supp. 728, 730 (D. Conn. 1991).

5

White v. Caterpiller, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1418, 1419 (W.D. Mo. 1991).
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(“HDC-ABMT”).6 The procedure involves the extraction of bone marrow, followed
by near lethal doses of chemotherapy, finalized by the replacement of the damaged
bone marrow, essentially rescuing the patient.7 Many doctors were “encouraged by
the promising preliminary data from HDC-ABMT research.”8 HDC-ABMT was not
considered a cure for this woman’s breast cancer. Instead, the procedure gave her a
better chance of remission, a significantly less amount of time in a hospital and a
shortened term of chemotherapy with its unavoidable side effects, that had
previously plagued her.9 The treatment provided an extension of time to the
woman’s life and ensured a modicum of comfort.10
At this point, the woman felt that HDC-ABMT was her only chance of survival
from a disease that was literally taking over her body. She decided to go though with
the procedure. Before being admitted into the health care facility, however, the
institution required pre-secured financing or pre-certification from a prospective
patient’s insurance company, guaranteeing that the treatment costs would be
reimbursed.11 The procedure costs between $100,000 and $150,000 per patient.12
She automatically assumed that her insurance coverage would cover the expense.
Her insurance company denied her request, deeming High Doses of
Chemotherapy with Autologous Bone Morrow Transplantation (“HDC-ABMT”) as
being “experimental” and “investigative”, thus falling outside of coverage.13 The
woman not only faced the emotional distress of realizing that conventional treatment
could no longer help her, but now had to deal with the reality that her only course of
action was now unattainable.14 When she signed her health insurance contract she
thought she would be covered for anything. She had no idea that a provision, a
simple sentence of text, would essentially cost her her life. As she paid her
premiums every month, she felt secure, protected from any possible health
conditions that she would encounter.
She had undergone treatments that had proven ineffective.15 She had been told
that death was inevitable without HDC-ABMT.16 The health care institution which
6
Kekis v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utica-Watertown, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 571, 574
(N.D.N.Y. 1993).
7

Id. “A patient undergoing HDC-ABMT is hospitalized, often in intensive care, for
approximately ten days of the treatment and requires full-time medical attention.” Id.
8

Id. at 574.

9

Kulakowski, 779 F. Supp. at 714. Based on medical research results reported in medical
literature before 1991, “achieving a remission in metastic breast cancer, conventional
chemotherapy is 30-60% effective and HDC-ABMT is 70-90% effective.” Id.
10

Id.

11

Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 1993).

12

Id.

13

Thomas v. Gulf Health Plan Inc., 688 F. Supp. 590, 593 (S.D. Ala. 1988). The decision
to deny coverage was based on the fact that the plan excluded experimental or investigative
procedures. Id.
14

Id. at 594.

15

White, 765 F. Supp. at 1419.
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promised to provide her with such treatment required pre-payment, that her
insurance company denied. Her options looked bleak. She decided to turn to the law
for remedy.
Instead of entering into a personal injury lawsuit, she found herself involved in a
contracts dispute. The language of the insurance contract was being scrutinized,
instead of the injustice of the denial of coverage. The way in which the word
“experimental” was defined became more important then how young this woman
was and the number children she would leave behind if she was not able to receive
HDC-ABMT treatment. The more ambiguous the term, the more likely she would
receive a possible preliminary injunction, allowing her to have the amount of money
to proceed with treatment.17
Unfortunately, the woman’s law suit against her insurance company was also
preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).18
ERISA contains a vague preemption provision that supersedes “any and all State
laws insofar as they may relate to any employee benefit plans.”19 The woman could
not bring any further state common law claims, such as emotional distress, against
her insurance company under ERISA.20 She was also bound by the remedies
provided by ERISA.21
Litigation lingered and the woman died before trial. The woman’s legal attempts
proved futile. Her husband sued her insurance company for breach of contract,
infliction of emotional distress, fraud and wrongful death, but ERISA preempted all
four claims.22 The husband’s claims were preempted because they stemmed from the
denial of benefits to his wife.23 Further, under ERISA the husband could not
personally bring a suit against the insurance company because he lacked standing.24
Due to the fact that the woman died, an award of benefits no longer existed.25
The hypothetical above combines the facts of numerous cases, that had
developed between 1988 and 1997 regarding HDC-ABMT, and proceeds to bring to
life the real issues that the legal community must face with insurance companies’
coverage of revolutionary treatments. “It is a society-wide problem of how to
provide last-chance health care to a person who may have a small chance at survival
if provided an expensive cutting edge treatment that she cannot afford out of her own
16

Id.

17

Dahl-Eimers v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 1379, 1381 (11th Cir. 1993).

18

Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196, 197 (1st Cir. 1997)

19

Id. at 199.

20

Thomas, 688 F. Supp. at 595. ERISA preempts state law doctrines, including that of
estoppel, even though it is a contract cause of action. Id.
21

Susan O. Scheutzow, A Framework for Analysis of ERISA Preemption in Suits Against
Health Plans and a Call for Reform, 11 J. L. & HEALTH, 195, 209 (1996-1997).
22

Foster v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 969 F. Supp.1020, 1024 (E.D. Mich.
1997).
23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id.
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resources”26 This Note is not trying to solve this problem. Instead, the purpose of
this Note is to recognize the flaws with the legal system’s dealings with insurance
benefit denial.
The specific analysis of HDC-ABMT will help the reader to realize that the
medical procedures being dealt with by litigation are not necessarily wildly
innovative. Insurance companies are hiding behind the guise of words such as
“experimental” to avoid paying for treatments that are both feasible and needed.
Further, HDC-ABMT being used for breast cancer patients, suggests a possible
discriminatory aspect that cannot be reached with current legal intervention.
This Note suggests ways of dealing with insurance coverage denial on a more
direct level. Instead of being bogged down by contract language and ERISA
preemption, proposals for national standards and expert committees would rectify the
injustice of benefit denial by taking away insurance company discretion. Then
Courts could deal with case by case scenarios according to the actual denial, not the
language of a provision in a contract.
II. MEDICAL BACKGROUND
Based on medical studies, one out of eight or nine women today will be
diagnosed with breast cancer.27 This is a dramatic increase from the 1940's where
only one out of twenty women were diagnosed with the disease.28 The sudden
escalation of victims has greatly heightened public fear.29 This heightened fear has
put pressure on the medical field to produce a treatment to combat breast cancer.
Currently, there is no curative approach to stage IV breast cancer.30 Conventional
uses of chemotherapy and radiation, used in other cancers, proved to be not
extremely effective with advance stage patients.
The increasing of dose intensity has been a successful way of improving the
effect of many drugs.31 In the past ten years there has been a sudden interest in dose
intensity of chemotherapy in breast cancer treatment.32 Most studies showed a
higher complete and total response rate to high-dose chemotherapy then lower

26

Turner, 127 F.3d at 200.

27

Eric J. Feuer et al., The Lifetime Risk of Developing Breast Cancer, 85 J. NAT’L CANCER
INST. 892 (1993). Statistical calculations were derived from a multiple decrement life table
applying age-specific incidence and mortality rates against population data. Id.
28
Id. The dramatic increase was thought to have stemmed from the fact that women are
living longer and dying less often of other causes. Id. at 896.
29

Id.

30

Stephanie F. Williams et al., High-Dose Consolidation Therapy with Autologous Stem
Cell Rescue in Stage IV Breast Cancer, 7 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1824 (1989). Doctors do
believe that autologous transplants might be curative in women with stage IV breast cancer
because it promotes a higher complete response rate. Id. at 1829.
31

VINCENT T. DEVITA ET AL., CANCER PRINCIPALS & PRACTICE OF ONCOLOGY 343 (5th ed.
1997).
32

JAMES HOLLAND ET AL., CANCER MED. 1286 (4th ed. 1997).
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amounts.33 Higher dosages of chemotherapy produces a larger amount of toxicity,
rendering the immune system defective.34 Escalating treatment doses causes
irreversible bone marrow suppression.35 Bone marrow transplantation, however,
allows improvement with response rates without the toxic level ramifications.36
Autologous bone marrow transplantation (ABMT) was first tested in humans in
the 1950s.37 The procedure involves the harvesting of a patient’s own bone marrow
and later reinfusing the substance back into the person’s system.38 “Bone marrow is
placed into a heparinized tissue culture medium, passed through wire mesh to
remove aggregates, and infused intravenously,” where hematopoietic stem cells
produce new cells.39 Autologous bone marrow transplants allow higher doses of
chemotherapy. The return of bone marrow rescues a patient’s immune system from
the serious life threatening effects of aggressive chemotherapy treatments.40
As with other treatments there are complications with HDC-ABMT that could
cause patients problems. About 5% of patients will die of infections and other
complications during the time period where bone marrow is growing back to support
their immune system.41 Long-term survivors have a greater risk of developing
secondary leukemias.42 Infertility and difficulties with sexual functions further
damage the procedures’ success.43
The real question that counters the treatment, however, is whether HDC-ABMT
is truly superior to conventional chemotherapy for later stage breast cancer patients.
The medical advisory board of Chicago’s Technology Evaluation Center found
HDC-ABMT a “viable option for some women with advanced metastatic breast
cancer” based on new assessments of the procedure done in 1996.44 Yet the

33

Id. “Retrospective analysis and perspective clinical trials have demonstrated a doseresponse relationship in terms of objective response, duration of remission, and quality of
life.” Id.
34

Richard L. Souter et al., Bone Marrow Transplantation, 310 BRITISH MED. J. 31 (1995).

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Emory School of Medicine, Bone-Marrow Transplants Increase Survival for Breast
Cancer Patients, CANCER WKLY., May 25, 1992, at 7 [hereinafter Emory].
38

Id.

39
ALEXANDER FEFER ET AL., MEDICAL ONCOLOGY BASIC PRINCIPLES
MANAGEMENT OF CANCER 1117 (2d ed. 1993).

AND

CLINICAL

40

Emory, supra note 37, at 7.

41

Kara Smigel, Women Flock to ABMT for Breast Cancer Without Final Proof, 87 J.
NAT’L CANCER INST. 952 (1995).
42

Id. Greater risk of secondary leukemias based on long-term survivors of high-dose
regimens for other cancers. Id.
43

Souter et al., supra note 34, at 34.

44

Mark Hagland, Technology and Treatments on Trial, 70 HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORK 40
(1996). Center’s assessment noted this treatment actually got better results than conventional
therapy. Id. at 41.
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procedure fails to be considered a “standard treatment” for advanced staged breast
cancer patients because of the “lack of controlled studies and the presence of
numerous biases” when compared to standard chemotherapy.45 Randomized
controlled trials comparing HDC-ABMT and conventional-dose chemotherapy are
needed to prove HDC-ABMT’s effectiveness.46 One of the reasons that clinical trials
are not being administered as often as they are needed to standardize the treatment is
that patients refuse to be randomized.47 The chance of not receiving high-dose
chemotherapy is preventing many women from entering into clinical trials.48 Further,
insurance companies are less likely to cover involvement with clinical trials because
of the “experimental” nature of the programs.
Essentially, HDC-ABMT is not being covered by insurance because it is deemed
“experimental”. The procedure is considered “experimental” because the treatment
has not gone through enough clinical trials comparing HDC-ABMT to standard dose
chemotherapy.
Clinical trials involving HDC-ABMT and conventional
chemotherapy have not been successful because insurance will not cover clinical
trials since they are “experimental”. Thus, the word “experimental” is preventing a
procedure that has been found to save people’s lives from becoming a standard
which would allow a larger amount of people to benefit.
III. REASONS WHY INSURANCE SHOULD AUTOMATICALLY COVER TREATMENT
HDC-ABMT is not a radically innovative concept. The procedure is taking a
standard cancer treatment, elevating the dosage and inserting a protective measure to
insure recovery. Insurance companies are not compensating such a treatment
because it has not been proven to be superior to conventional-doses of
chemotherapy. Yet, HDC-ABMT has been proven to save people’s lives.
Furthermore, the quality of life that patients experience after treatment is
encouraging.49 A year or longer after treatment, patients reported little limitations or
resulting problems.50
The fact that HDC-ABMT has been suggested to patients as a last resort for later
stage breast cancer, should also be taken into consideration. If the treatment has
been proven to successfully combat the disease in other types of cancer, then the
procedure should not be denied for breast cancer patients. Insurance companies
should not have the discretion of choosing which cancer patients should essentially
live or die.

45

Nancy E. Davidson, Out of the Courtroom and into the Clinic, 10 J. CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY 517 (1992).
46

Id.

47

Elisabeth de Vries et al., Breast Cancer Studies in the Netherlands, 348 LANCET 407
(1996).
48

Id.

49

William P. Peters et al., High-Dose Chemotherapy and Autologous Bone Marrow
Support as Consolidation After Standard-Dose Adjuvant Therapy for High Risk Primary
Breast Cancer, 11 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1141 (1993).
50

Id.
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A. Just a Higher Dosage of Chemotherapy
One way of looking at HDC-ABMT is not to see the procedure as a new
treatment. Instead, ABMT “simply allows for higher doses of chemotherapy.”51
Chemotherapy emerged in the early 1900s with the work of Paul Ehrlich.52
Alkylating agents, used in early chemotherapy, were a product of gas warfare used in
World War I and II.53 Even though chemotherapy created an exciting vehicle to use
against cancer, the treatment was flawed in that the tumors inevitably grew back.54
Chemotherapy successfully treating childhood leukemias and Hodgkin’s disease in
the 1960s, actually proved that different manipulations of the drug could cure cancer.
The positive results of chemotherapy forced research to focus on the application of
the treatment toward solid tumors.
The failure of chemotherapy with solid tumors was thought to stem from the
variation in growth characteristics and multidrug resistance.55 The emphasis of
studies was on maximizing the interaction of the chemotherapy with the cycling
cancer cell.56 There appears to be a threshold dose of chemotherapy that produces a
response in tumors.57 Some tumors require a higher dosage to improve drug
responsiveness.58
Chemotherapy has been proven by numerous experiments in many different
cancers to be a successful treatment. Chemotherapy has been the most known and
effective way of battling cancer for the last thirty years. HDC-ABMT is not dealing
with a new drug or revolutionary concept. HDC-ABMT is simply utilizing a
standard treatment that has already been proven effective and raising the dosage to a
higher level to produce the needed response for solid tumors in breast cancer
patients.
B. Considered a Standard Treatment with Other Cancers
The idea of increasing the level of intensity of chemotherapy and using a bone
marrow transplant to revitalize the patient is not a new concept based on the fact that
HDC-ABMT has proven effective in other cancers. “HDC-ABMT was first used to
treat a number of other cancers, including leukemia, lymphoma, and Hodgkin’s
disease.”59 Many health care providers found HDC-ABMT as a standard treatment
for these cancers and covered the procedure.60
51
Nancy Volkers, Cover Costs, Test Treatments, Pay Patients: Health Care Reform
Hearings Hot on Hill, 86 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 336 (1994).
52

DEVITA ET AL., supra note 31, at 333.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 334.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 344.

58

DEVITA ET AL., supra note 31, at 334.

59

Kulakowski, 779 F. Supp. at 711.

60

Id.
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HDC-ABMT has been extensively used in different leukemias.61 “Most patients
achieve complete remission.”62 The treatment has even provided complete
remissions in advanced stage cancer patients.63 HDC-ABMT has accomplished
prolonged disease-free survival in leukemia victims.64
Lymphoma patients also experienced complete remission with HDC-ABMT.65
Approximately one-third of patients actually have survived in remission for several
years.66 Most of the patients exposed to HDC-ABMT had a failed response to
standard dose chemotherapy.67 Research performed involving this treatment with
lymphoma patients has revealed that very intensive regimens of chemotherapy are
capable of eradicating the disease resistant to standard treatment.68
Standard combination chemotherapy and radiation proved ineffective in patients
with Hodgkin’s disease.69 Patients turned to HDC-ABMT when standard dose
chemotherapy failed.70 HDC-ABMT not only proved effective, but produced
sustained remissions in high risk patients.71 Further, HDC-ABMT has been used in
cancers that relapse or even progress during standard chemotherapy, such as multiple
myeloma.72 The majority of patients suffering from multiple myeloma achieved a
marked reduction or disappearance of paraprotein after HDC-ABMT.73
HDC-ABMT has been used in the treatment of many different types of
chemotherapy-responsive tumors, including ovarian cancer, testicular/germ cell
carcinomas and small cell carcinoma of the lung.74 A number of malignant tumors
that poorly respond to conventional treatment have been treated with HDC-ABMT
and the treatment has increased response rates and has produced remissions.75
HDC-ABMT for breast cancer patients should not be considered “experimental”
and should be automatically covered by insurance because the treatment is
considered standard and successful in so many other types of cancers. “Thousands
of patients have received this therapeutic approach, and the results are consistent and
61

CHARLES M. HASKELL, CANCER TREATMENT 193 (4th ed. 1995).

62

Id. at 194.

63

Id. at 200.

64

Id. at 194.

65

Id. at 200. Approximately seventy percent of patients have their leukemia recur within
two years, but this poses the major cause of treatment failure. Id.
66

Id.

67

HASKELL, supra note 61, at 200.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 201.

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id. at 202.

73

HASKELL, supra note 61, at 202.

74

Id. at 203.

75

Id.
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well documented.”76 “Nearly every study has determined that the response rate is
improved over standard-dose alternatives and a fraction of patients have achieved
prolonged disease-free survival.”77
Patients dealing with later stage breast cancer are considered to be at high risk.
Advanced breast cancer has proven resistant to standard dose chemotherapy. Other
cancer patients have turned to HDC-ABMT when faced with similar circumstances.
Insurance companies should allow breast cancer patients the same freedom. If HDCABMT is considered a standard treatment in other cancers, the procedure should at
least be covered by insurance when utilized by breast cancer patients. The treatment
itself has not changed; only the type of cancer it is battling.
C. Suggested by Doctors as a Last Resort
“If the patient does not receive this treatment in the very near future, the chances
of recurrence and resulting death are extremely high.”78 Many advanced stage breast
cancer patients are taunted by similar words by their doctors. A larger percentage of
women are hearing such words since breast cancer has become the most common
form of cancer among American women.79 HDC-ABMT has become a last resort for
many of these women, since their breast cancer has metastaticized, spreading all over
their bodies.80 “Many women believe that they have little to lose with ABMT and
that it is the only reasonable approach in an otherwise hopeless situation.”81
Many physicians promote HDC-ABMT based on the possibility that the woman
would have a longer life expectancy.82 When surgery, radiation and standard dose
chemotherapy fail to stop breast cancer progression, physicians are left suggesting
HDC-ABMT as a last chance for survival.83 Women with advanced stage breast
cancer see HDC-ABMT as their only hope.84
HDC-ABMT serves as a last combat maneuver against breast cancer.85 The
treatment essentially kills everything. HDC-ABMT prevents cancer from growing
back.86 HDC-ABMT not only permits intense amounts of chemotherapy, but also
76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Judge Asked to Force Insurer to Pay for Cancer Treatment: Mutual of Omaha, CANCER
WKLY., Aug. 31, 1992, at 7.
79

Sandy Lutz, HMO to Finance Trials of Cancer Treatment, MODERN HEALTH CARE, Apr.
8, 1991, at 20.
80
Medical College of Wisconsin, ABMT Has Benefits for Metastatic Breast Cancer, but
May Be Too Expensive, CANCER WKLY., Apr. 20, 1992, at 10.
81

Id.

82

Id.

83
Autologous Bone Marrow Transplants for Advanced Breast Cancer, 20 HEALTHFACTS 4
(1995).
84

Id.

85

Medical College of Wisconsin, Researchers Pioneer New Bone Marrow Transplant
Techniques, CANCER WKLY., July 6, 1992, at 15.
86

Id.
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attacks recurrent cancer by stimulating an immune response against the tumor.87
Whatever the high dose chemotherapy fails to dissolve, the immune response
stimulated by the drug used to reinfuse bone marrow will clean-up.88 HDC-ABMT
serves as a last resort that launches a double attack on cancer cells.
HDC-ABMT is not a trivial, merely cosmetic treatment that a patient could live
with or without. For patients who do not respond to conventional treatment, HDCABMT offers the “best opportunity for long survival.”89 Women turn to this
treatment as a last effort to survive breast cancer. Insurance denial of benefits for
HDC-ABMT is essentially costing women’s lives. Allowing a woman benefits is
costing an insurance company money. Denying a woman benefits is costing a
woman all remaining hope.90
IV. CURRENT LEGAL APPROACH MUST BE CHANGED
Under current legal means, the courts are bound by the contract language of
insurance policies. Courts are unable to directly counter benefit denial. The
“Court’s role is limited to determining whether interpretation (of the insurance
policy) was made rationally and in good faith — not whether it was right.”91 If a
treatment is specifically not covered by the insurance policy, the court cannot alter
the terms of the plan.92 Courts are, however, able to clarify the terms of the policy
when the language is ambiguous.93
The problem with strictly relying on contract language is that when a policy
specifically states refusal to pay for a certain treatment or procedure there is no way
for the insured to fight against the benefit denial. Many women are encountering
provisions in their insurance policies that specifically exclude HDC-ABMT for
breast cancer.94 According to current legal intervention, if the meaning of a
provision is clear, the analysis is over.95
Courts cannot punish an insurance
company for merely applying a clearly stated provision of a contract previously
agreed upon by both the insured and the insurer.
Litigation surrounding benefit denial is thrusted solely into contract dispute not
only by way of policy language but also though ERISA. ERISA, Employment

87

Id.

88

Id.

89
Pierre L. Triozzi, Autologous Bone Marrow and Peripheral Blood Progenitor
Transplant for Breast Cancer, 344 LANCET 418 (1994).
90

Kulakowski, 779 F. Supp. at 717.

91

Thomas, 688 F. Supp. at 595.

92

Id.

93

Michael Rembold, Serving the Patient, or Self-Serving?, 27 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 142
(1994).
94

Caudil v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of N.C., 999 F.2d 74, 79 (4th Cir. 1993). Policy
specifically states, “Autologous bone marrow transplants for breast cancer are not listed.”
(holding reaffirmed granting defendants summary judgment, based on contract language). Id.
at 80.
95

Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 589.
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Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, contains a vague preemption provision that
supersedes all state claims.96 If ERISA provides a specific remedy for an alleged
wrong, then all other claims are preempted.97 Even if the insured wanted to bring
other causes of action, to divert from specific contract language analysis, most
insurance policies would not allow such an action to proceed since most insurance
companies are governed by ERISA. Claims for breach of contract, negligent
misrepresentation, fraud, wrongful death, bad faith and infliction of emotional
distress are all preempted by ERISA.98
“Insurance is obtained for its coverage and protection, and the natural
presumption of the policyholder could be expected to be covered.”99 Public interest
must also factor into court decisions.100 Courts must look beyond the language of the
contract and take into account not only the reliance people put into insurance
coverage, but also weigh the medical necessity of the treatment.101 Further, the
language of the policy may not have been changed to meet the advancements in
medicine.102
The law acts as an equalizer. Allowing legal intervention to strictly adhere to
contract language interpretation completely destroys the reasoning behind litigation.
“The courts must continue to evaluate the intent of the carriers, the benefits offered,
and the meaning of those benefits to the average person to allow both sides in this
significant arena to be on a level playing field.”103 Strict contract language
interpretation merely takes into account the meaning of the terms used and the
structure of the contract. The procedure, condition of the patient, and the
ramifications of benefit denial is not considered with current legal intervention.
Further, the actual denial of benefits for treatment is not addressed. Instead, the
ambiguity of the provision and the interpretation of the contract language by the
insurance companies are scrutinized.
There have been courts that have looked at benefit denial from a patient’s
perspective.104 “Very often, the courts have ruled in favor of the patient’s best
chance of survival in spite of the language of a given exclusion, and in spite of the

96

Turner, 127 F.3d at 199. The Supreme Court recently set some new limitations on
preemption by holding that certain laws were not sufficiently “related” to ERISA to deserve
preemption. Id.
97

Foster, 969 F. Supp. at 1020.

98

Id.

99

Rembold, supra note 93, at 143.

100

Id. at 144.

101

Id.

102

Id. at 145.

103

Id.

104

Mark Freedman, When Insurers Refuse to Pay: Experimental Surgical Procedures, 93
BEST’S REV. — LIFE-HEALTH INS. ED. 38, 43 (1993). Courts, by actually stepping in and
making decisions in favor of certain medical advancement, cause therapies that should not
necessarily be considered standard mainstream without medical backing. Id.
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fact that the therapy may indeed be investigational or experimental.”105 “Judges have
been willing not only to interpret contracts liberally, but sometimes to bypass them
altogether and order coverage for care that is ostensibly excluded under the
policy.”106 Patients, however, cannot rely on the chance that the court system will
lean in their direction. There is a definite need for legal intervention to have a
universal standard in which all patients are assured a chance to counter benefit denial
equally.
The pressure of negative publicity caused by the possible threat of numerous
lawsuits have forced many insurers to automatically cover HDC-ABMT.107 The
social threat placed on insurers may be beneficial to HDC-ABMT for breast cancer
right now, but if the procedure advanced and changed in a few years the social
pressure would take time to catch up with the newly developed treatment. Reliance
on fear generated by society is not a solid enough basis to ensure benefits to a dying
patient. Benefit denial must be dealt with another way.
A. Strictly Confined to the Language of the Contract
Under present law, courts are bound to interpret the language of the specific
insurance contract.108 Courts are unable to amend or expand coverage that is already
defined in the contract.109 Insurance coverage has been traditionally considered a
contract.110 “The insured pays premiums and the insurer agrees to protect the insured
from the harm insured against, should it occur.”111 However, insurance contracts
contain certain provisions that exclude treatments and procedures.
Language such as “benefits are not provided for services and supplies ... that are
investigational or experimental or mainly for research” lull insured into believing
that as long as they do not develop some strange disease their insurance policy will
cover their procedure.112 Patients determentally rely on insurance coverage to fund
any disease treatment that may be needed. When patients are denied coverage, they
automatically look at the procedure and determine that the treatment was not
experimental in the context of the medical profession and that the refusal was wrong.
The benefit denial may in fact be wrong, but according to the contract, the insurance
company did nothing wrong to deserve legal punishment. The insurance company
was simply adhering to their policy.
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Currently, courts determine if an insurance company’s actions in benefit denial
are wrong by way of contract language. If there is a question of a term’s ambiguity,
the court reviews the case de novo based on contract language.113 If there is a
conflict with an employee of the insurance company’s interpretation of a provision,
the court decides if the decision was arbitrary and capricious using the language of
the contract as a guide.114 The court tends not to focus on the actual benefit denial
since legal intervention has been brought down to a contract dispute. In order for an
insurance company to be found liable, they must have done something wrong. An
insurer can exclude HDC-ABMT treatment for breast cancer patients as long as the
language of the policy contract clearly allows such denial.115
Simply using the term “experimental” does not place a policy provision in the
realm of ambiguity.116 Courts must take an insurance contract as a whole.117 An
insurance policy is ambiguous when one interpretation results in coverage and
another ends in exclusion.118 Ambiguity also arises when a term is not properly
“defined or clarified” by the contract.119 Courts cannot create ambiguity where no
discrepancy exists.120 If a provision bluntly states: “HDC-ABMT is not covered for
breast cancer patients” then courts have a hard time countering benefit denial by way
of ambiguity.121
Courts can, however, still counter benefit denial if coverage of the treatment is
granted elsewhere in the contract.122 For instance in Jenkins, the women’s insurance
policy allowed HDC, but excluded ABMT.123 Without ABMT, the patient would die
when treated with HDC.124 HDC and ABMT are used in conjunction with one
another.125 Excluding ABMT and allowing HDC created an ambiguity in the
exclusion provision, thus creating a discrepancy for the court to act upon.
The experimental nature of a procedure and the medical necessity of the
treatment is only brought up in court when the contract specifically uses such terms
to describe what the policy covers. For example in Pirozzi, HDC-ABMT’s
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experimental status based upon medical use and scientific data became important
because the insurance contract specifically denied coverage to “experimental or
clinical investigative procedures”.126 The successful results of current tests and the
frequent use of the treatment would never have been mentioned or utilized as criteria
by the court if the contract provision had specifically excluded HDC-ABMT.
Further, as seen in Grethe, the appropriateness of the procedure would not be
weighed along side of the condition of the woman, if the contract had not required
that the treatment be “medically necessary”in order to be covered.127 Factors such as
test data and patient condition that should be automatically considered when
analyzing a benefit denial, are not considered by the court unless the contract
language of the policy forces the court to recognize such criteria. Legal intervention
is deeply rooted in contract text. If the provision does not address a certain issue, the
court will refrain from taking the issue into consideration when making its decision.
Exclusive focus on contract language not only holds true when dealing with term
ambiguity, but also is seen in determining the appropriateness of a provision’s
interpretation. When determining the intent behind an administrator or employee of
the insurance company’s interpretation of a provision, courts turn to the plain
language of the document.128 If the language of the contract vested a broad
discretionary authority to the plan’s administrator then the court must decide if the
decision was arbitrary and capricious.129 In order for a court to determine if an
insurance company had used its discretionary power in an overabundant manner, the
wording of the expressed exclusion is taken into consideration.130 If the
interpretation of the provision is not “plainly erroneous and is consistent with the
provision,” then the court will find in favor of the insurer.131 Even if the court would
come to a different conclusion, the agency’s decision, as long as the interpretation is
rational according to the contract language, would be considered the correct decision
according to the law.132
Patients’ chance of countering benefit denial based upon an administrator’s
interpretation of contract language becomes extremely difficult when the
exclusionary language of the contract is clear.133 It is impossible to show bad faith
when the contract language justifies the denial of benefits.134 Further, an
administrator’s actions are justified because he/she would not be fulfilling his/her
fiduciary duty if the terms of the contract language were expanded.135 Insurance
carriers owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders and boards of directors to refuse to pay
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for treatments that are costly that do not adhere to the policy provisions.136 An
insurance company must keep its own financial interests in mind.137 HDC-ABMT is
an expensive treatment, costing between $50,000 and $200,000 per patient.138
Denying this procedure would be in the best interest of the insurer. When the
language of the provision is clear and unambiguous, an administrator has every right
to decide the only logical interpretation of the contract.139 Not denying benefits for
HDC-ABMT when the language of the contract clearly stated such denial would
completely be against an insurance carrier’s fiduciary duty.
Courts have even found insurers immune from liability when an administrator
incorrectly interpreted a contract’s benefit denial provision.140 In Nesseim the Court
held that even though the insurance company looked to the “Surgical Benefits”
section instead of the section referring to chemotherapy, the decision to deny benefits
was not arbitrary and capricious.141 As long as the decision was not an “abuse of
discretion,” the law will not intervene by allowing benefits to be given and
essentially punishing the insurer.142 A reasonable interpretation of a plan provision,
made in good faith, following a rather detailed factual background investigation of
the claim completely overrides any discrepancy that an insured could bring to a court
of law.143
Current legal intervention allows insurance companies to incorrectly interpret its
contract language, make decisions without taking important considerations into
account and deny benefits that are not only justified but essential to a person’s life.
The only thing that an insurance company is obligated to do is clearly deny a specific
treatment or procedure in its contract to completely avoid any liability. The actual
contract, terms and structure, is the only thing that the courts look at to make their
decisions. A court is “empowered to decide legal issues presented by specific cases
or controversies.”144 It is not the court’s duty to engage in analyzing broader social
and ethical questions.145 The legislation has the prerogative of enacting statutes to
implement public policy.146 Under the present state of law, courts are bound to
interpret the language of the insurance contract because that is the only thing that
courts are presented with to analyze.147 Once legislation has enacted laws regarding
136
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benefit denial, an all inclusive analysis can take place. All of the issues that should
be taken into consideration would be addressed if a broader concept, such as a
statute, as opposed to a contract, was imposed.
Current legal intervention also encourages insurance companies to specifically
exclude medical treatments and procedures in its contract language. Courts are
forcing insurance carriers to specify specific conditions when a procedure would be
covered.148 For example in Jenkins, ABMT is covered by insurance if it is used to
treat “Hodgkin’s Disease (Stage III or IV), Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma (intermediate
or high grade), Neuroblastoma (Stage III or IV), Acute Lymphomic Leukemia,
Acute Non-Lymphomic Leukemia, and Germ Cell Tumors of Ovary, Testes,
Mediastinum, Retroperitoneum.”149 This contract excludes not only breast cancer
but stage II Hodgkin’s Disease and low grade Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma which
seems contradictory since not only is the same procedure being used, but the same
disease is being treated. Specifying coverage to this extreme discriminates against a
higher percentage of people. Basing legal decisions strictly on contract language
leaves this higher percentage of people with no remedy. Courts have in actuality
forced insurance companies to discriminate against more people, essentially taking
any chance of compensation away from a higher percentage of insured. Courts
finding phrases such as “experimental and investigational” and “medically
necessary” as being ambiguous and punishable, has coerced insurance companies
into creating clearer contract language that excludes a larger amount of procedures
and treatments, essentially effecting more people’s lives. Instead of helping, legal
intervention has adversely effected benefit denial since the language of insurance
contracts is the only thing courts are able to consider.
B. ERISA Further Constricts Legal Intervention
“Due to the proliferation of employee benefit plans and their effect on the wellbeing of millions of employees and their dependants, Congress in 1974 enacted the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq.) to
protect individuals from being deprived of these benefits.”150 The purpose of ERISA
was to “ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of
benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden of
complying with conflicting directives among States [and to prevent] the potential for
conflict in substantive law.”151 ERISA was enacted “to promote the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans and to protect
contractually defined benefits.”152
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ERISA provides a private right of action to recover benefits due under federal
law.153 “ERISA does not require employers to provide benefit plans but does strictly
regulate how voluntary, self-insured, plans may be administered.”154 For an insurance
company to be governed by ERISA it must be considered an “employee welfare
benefit plan.”155 Certain criteria must be met in order for an insurance plan to be
deemed as an “employee welfare benefit plan,” thus governed by ERISA.156 This
criteria encompasses “a plan, fund, or program established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization for medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability and to participants
or their beneficiaries.”157 If the criteria is not met, the claim for benefit denial
regarding a self-insured plan cannot not be brought under ERISA.158
Insurer’s liability became limited because ERISA contains a vague but broadly
worded preemption provision.159 ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”160 ERISA
provides a specific remedy for benefit denial, thus preempting all other claims.161
The statute carefully sets forth six civil enforcement provisions that specifically
authorizes detailed remedy.162 Courts are reluctant to allow other causes of action
when the statute specifically enumerates adequate remedy.163 ERISA governs benefit
denial. Resorting to other sources to claim recovery is unnecessary and incorrect
since remedy has already been established by an act.164
ERISA’s preemption to all other claims, forces courts to once again strictly
adhere to contract language. According to ERISA, analysis of benefit denial
properly begins with the plan’s terms.165 With ERISA, patients who are denied
benefits are pushed solely into contract dispute since their other causes of action are
preempted. Patients are unable to turn to other claims such as breach of contract, bad
faith, negligent misrepresentation or fraud when the contract language of the
exclusion provision specifically excludes a certain treatment or provision.166
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Further, “under ERISA the insurance carrier has the contractual power to change
the terms of the insurance policy.”167 The insurance company can completely change
what it will cover as long as it gives the employer notice of such changes in a timely
manner.168 The employer, who is the sponsor of the ERISA benefit plan, is then
given the option of discontinuing the plan and seeking another carrier.169 The
insurance company is given a massive amount of power in a court of law since it is
in control of amending the contract language. The insured is not only deprived
alternate causes of action, but is subjected to contract term alteration with no redress.
The law has made it difficult to counter ERISA. “A reasonable interpretation of
the ERISA plan will stand unless participants can show not only that a potential
conflict of interest exists, but that the conflict affected the reasonableness of the
decision.”170 There is an innate conflict of interest found in insurance companies
deciding benefit coverage.171 The insurance carrier has the fiduciary duty to deny or
grant benefits properly, while keeping the profit-making objective of the insurance
company.172 Essentially, the insurance company that interprets the plan, determining
coverage, ultimately pays those expenses form its own coffers.173 However, this
conflict of interest, insurers interpretating their own contracts, does not constitute a
violation of ERISA.174
The language of ERISA also determines who has standing to bring a claim for
benefit denial.175 Only “participants” and “beneficiaries” have standing under
ERISA to bring a claim countering benefit denial.176 A “fiduciary”, a person who
has discretionary authority over the plan,” has the right to bring a claim for equitable
relief, but only the participant of the insurance plan or the person who was actually
denied the benefits can claim under ERISA.177
Limiting the category of the people that can bring a claim of benefit denial has
caused some real problems when the person denied actually dies.178 Families of
people who die are unable to bring a cause action against the insurer because ERISA
preempts wrongful death.179 The idea behind not allowing families to claim stems
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from the concept that once the person dies, an award of benefits no longer exists.180
Allowing families to claim would essentially allow an award of extra contractual
damages which ERISA does not cover.181 Further, even if the family member were
to claim on behalf of their dead family member, they would be directly countering
language set forth in ERISA.182 ERISA only provides standing to “participants,”
“beneificiaries,” and “fiduciaries.” The family member would not fall under any of
the three categories, thus allowing the member to claim would create a violation of
the statute.183 The idea behind ERISA is to provide compensation for wrongful
denial of benefits to someone who will benefit from litigation, not for the deceased
who may not have benefited from the treatment or procedure.184
V. PROPOSALS TO RECTIFY PROBLEMS SURROUNDING BENEFIT DENIAL
Essentially, insurance exists to provide protection.185 Current legal intervention
is not taking into consideration the reliance that people put into insurance coverage.
Rarely does a person take the time to actually check what their policy covers.186
Patients detrimentally believe that insurance will cover anything. It is not until a
person is in a life threatening situation and the insurance company refuses benefits,
that people realize that they signed a contract that denied them certain coverage.187
Courts cannot step in and simply override an insurance contract.188 The language
of the contract determines what is in fact covered.189 There are, however, numerous
other factors that should be considered. The contract language should be adhered to
and focused on by courts when determining if a benefit denial was appropriate, but
other factors, such as the treatment serving as a last resort for the patient and the
similarity of the procedure to others that are covered, should also be taken into
account.
When a costly state of the art treatment, such as HDC-ABMT, is denied coverage
there should be a way for the legal community to counter automatic denial.190
Insurance companies are not obligated to periodically update its list of coverable
treatments.191 Therefore, when insurance contracts specifically exclude certain
procedures, based on the concept that the treatment is “experimental”, when the
180
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treatment is no longer considered experimental in the medical community, courts
should be able to intervene. Based on strict contract language interpretation, the
procedure’s denial would be legal. Based on the reason behind denying the
treatment, the denial should be reversed.
A national committee made up of medical and economic experts could be used to
constantly update what procedures and treatments should be deemed experimental.192
Insurance companies would then be forced to cover a larger range of cutting edge
medical techniques. Not only would this concept benefit patients, but it would
rapidly advance medicine. Areas of medicine would develop because more people
could gain access to new procedures, allowing more assessments to be performed by
medical experts, leading to possible progress.193
Legal intervention being strictly bound to contract language could be alleviated if
there was a national mandated coverage of benefits. Creating a national law
mandating coverage of all procedures would completely take away any discretionary
power from insurance companies.194 Insurance carriers could no longer decide which
procedures or treatments would be covered.195 This concept would lead to higher
insurance premiums, but benefit denial would never occur.196 A person in a life
threatening situation could then rely on his/her insurance.
A national committee and a national law mandating benefits are only two
proposals suggested to remedy the problems arising from current legal intervention.
These two proposals are not necessarily the best or worst ideas that could be used,
but only should serve as suggestions to ponder. Even though, the trend, as seen on a
lower level, seems to be pointing in a similar direction.
A. National Committee to Determine If Experimental
There is a “relentless technological momentum” driving advancements in
medicine at a fast rate.197 Legal intervention tends to be behind the times. “The old
maxim that “the wheels of justice move slowly” is usually all too true.”198 Constant
medical advancement is posing a problem when defining the word “experimental”.
At what point does a procedure or treatment stop being considered experimental?
Allowing insurance companies the discretionary power to determine what is
experimental poses problems when medical advancements are happening so rapidly.
Further, there is no duty that the insurance company must update its list of coverable
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advancements.199 Thus, insurance contract coverage is based on provisions possibly
set forth twenty years earlier. Courts are then relying on terms that have essentially
been outdated for years.
Insurance carriers are not doctors. Insurance companies are overriding the word
of a doctor with no medical background or training. To possibly resolve the problem
of allowing a medically uneducated establishment from defining a medically
emersed term, experimental, a committee may be imposed. A composition of
“ontologists, internists, surgeons, experts in medical ethics, medical school
administrators, economists, representatives of the insurance industry, patient
advocates and politicians” may be able to define “experimental” in a more universal
manner, taking all aspects of the reviewed procedure or treatment under
consideration.200 “Through such a collective task force perhaps some consensus
might be reached concerning the definition of experimental procedures” that would
balance insurers concern with costs with insured medical worries.201
Utilizing a diverse task force would incorporate the concerns that current legal
intervention is unable to consider. Further, contract ambiguity posed by the term
“experimental” would be eliminated. No universally acceptable definition of
experimental and nonexperimental currently exists.202 “Experimental” would
continuously be defined by the committee. Therefore, insurance companies could
use the term without any chance of liability. The word “experimental” would be
used instead of specific exclusionary language, thus providing insureds a better
chance of coverage for procedures that are considered on the crux of development.
A national committee defining experimental procedures and treatments would
avoid numerous legal disputes, since benefit denial would be continually reviewed.
Besides, a committee would keep courts from making medical determinations that it
is not trained to make.203 “Judges and juries should not be asked to make
determinations of clinical efficacy” when the information is surrounded by medical
terminology too convoluted for the average person to understand.204
A national committee would judge the experimental nature of a treatment
objectively.205 Even though each member of the committee may be biased by their
area of expertise, they still would be outsiders deciding if a specific procedure should
be covered.206 None of the members would be directly effected by the decision they
made. Whereas, insurance companies were making decisions that determined the
amount of money taken away from the company.
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A national committee would solve a lot of the problems surrounding current legal
intervention regarding benefit denial. Insurance companies’ discretionary power
would be limited. An insurance carrier could no longer determine what procedures
and treatments would be covered and which would be denied. Instead, a diverse
group of individuals would have the authority based on their individual expertise to
determine the experimental nature of a treatment.
B. Nationally Mandated Benefits
Many states have enacted statutes that require insurance policies to cover certain
treatments and procedures.207 Legislation has intervened, establishing a series of
uniform, statewide standards to override specific contract exclusions set forth by
insurance companies.208 State statutes were created to implement the same public
policy that legal intervention was unable to consider in its decision.209 The statutes
specifically stated the procedure or treatment that it mandated.
For example in Massachusetts, a statute bluntly states that “any individual policy
of accident and sickness insurance . . . shall provide coverage for a bone marrow
transplant or transplants for persons who have been diagnosed with breast cancer that
had progressed to metastic disease.”210 In New Hampshire “each insurer that issues
or renews any policy of group or blanket accident or health insurance . . . shall
provide . . . coverage for expenses arising from the treatment of breast cancer by
autologous bone marrow transplants according to protocols reviewed and approved
by the National Cancer Institute.”211 Legislation stepped in and countered benefit
denial by simply mandating benefits.
A national standard mandating all benefits would ensure that all persons would
have access to promising technologies.212 If specific mandated benefits have been
enacted at a state level, mandating benefits at a national level should be allowed as
well. Mandating benefits nationally would completely negate insurance contract
exclusions. Insurance companies could no longer exclude a certain procedure or
treatment because under the national standard everything would be covered. Further,
ERISA would be overruled. Taking benefit denial to a national level would override
any legislation enacted on a federal one, thus erasing ERISA.
Along with the equality that a national standard produces comes the limitless
amounts of money that such a concept would require.213 Insurance companies would
be required to cover every possible benefit for everyone.214 Insurance companies
could never be able to afford such expenses. A national standard would “force
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insurers and employers to impose “taxes” in the form of higher premiums.”215
Premiums would have to be increased to compensate insurers.216 “The adverse
consequences of this expansion are greatest for individuals at the lower end of the
income scale.”217 These are the same people that originally found themselves
involved in legal disputes over benefit denial. Raising the premiums may allow
universal and all inclusive coverage, but if the premiums become so high that people
are unable to access insurance the whole point of a national standard becomes moot.
A national standard would produce a uniform approach to benefit denial.218
When a doctor suggested a procedure, an insurance company could no longer
override the physician’s recommendation.219 A national standard would eliminate
any problems arising from current legal intervention because essentially benefit
denial would no longer exist. Insurance companies would be forced to cover
everything. Insurance carriers would no longer have the discretionary power to
decide benefit accessibility. The enactment of a national standard, however, may
open a whole new bundle of problems that the law will have to face. Higher
premiums would allow universal coverage but at the same time may completely
exclude general insurance to people by pushing coverage to an unattainable amount.
People would no longer be denied benefits, but insurance premiums may become so
high that people could be denied insurance coverage altogether.
VI. CONCLUSION
Current legal intervention is fatally flawed by the fact that it is unable to draw
from all directions to decide if insurance benefit denial was appropriate. Courts are
bound by the language that insurance companies set forth in their policies. Instead of
being able to take the whole forest into consideration, courts are constrained to
strictly looking at the trees.
Specifically analyzing HDC-ABMT has shown the real injustice of courts being
forced to make decisions based solely on contract language. The fact that HDCABMT simply allows for a higher dosage of an already proven treatment cannot be
taken into account by courts. Nor can the fact that this same procedure is
automatically covered by insurance policies when it is used for a different type of
cancer. Even the fact that this procedure is the last resort that many women have left
to survive, must be negated. Courts have only the words of a contract, that
specifically excludes a treatment or procedure, to base its’ decision. If a policy
excludes the treatment, then the benefit denial is valid, even though the insured
determentally relied on the coverage.
Strictly adhering to contract interpretation adversely effects the patient. When
the insureds signed their contract they were under the assumption that they would be
protected from everything. People tend not to read all the exclusions stated in their
insurance policy. However, courts solely judge benefit denial on such exclusions.
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As long as the language of the contract is clear and insurance carriers base denial on
this language, insureds will not win in a court of law.
This Note is not inferring that courts are wrong in their actions. Nor is the Note
stating that insurance companies are necessarily evil when they exclude certain
costly procedures. The Note is simply focusing on the fact that current legal
intervention does not look at the whole picture when deciding benefit denial. Legal
intervention must change to include all aspects touching the denial because insurance
policies are becoming more specific and are excluding more procedures.
Establishing a nationally mandated benefits act and a diverse committee to decide
what should be considered experimental may not necessarily be the answer.
Allowing legal intervention to continue to progress in the same direction, is
definitely not the answer. Current legal intervention must be changed before more
lives are lost to a contract provision.
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